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Abstract:  
Minerals originated from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are blamed for 
financing violent conflict in the area over the past decade and have been called conflict 
minerals. They vividly demonstrate a key human rights issue facing responsible supply 
chain management. The conflict minerals issue has led to a significant shift in 
responsible supply chain management in two ways: extending producer responsibility to 
respect human rights in the total supply chain through establishing traceability and 
transparency; and developing legally binding supply chain responsibility.  
This paper examines an emerging effort to source conflict-free minerals using 
closed-pipe supply chain in the DRC as a new strategy to respond to the above 
paradigm shift. By exploring whether this new strategy can contribute to conflict 
prevention in the DRC, this paper argues that the closed-pipe supply chain allows 
building long-term relationship with various stakeholders and has the potential to 
transform socio-economic structures in the producing communities, thereby leading to 
peacebuilding in the long run.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, industries have been increasingly scrutinised for human rights violation 
in their extensive supply chains, such as labour conditions and the use of child labour, 
mirroring the global expansion of business operations and growing consumer activism. 
Human rights issues have been alerted as one of the top five strategic management risks 
(Shtender-Auerbach 2010). Amongst various human rights concerns, conflict minerals 
including tantalum (found in coltan), tin (cassiterite), tungsten and gold that are 
originated from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the one which poses a 
significant challenge for responsible supply chain management to a wide array of 
industries.  
Electronics industries were the first to be blamed for using conflict minerals and 
questioned their corporate responsibility by civil society organisations. This was 
because the rapid development and spread of small-size, high-tech equipment such as 
mobile phones during the 1990s had created supply shortages of tantalum as one of the 
essential ingredients for those apparatuses. The supply shortages encouraged the 
exploitation of tantalum in eastern DRC during the second Congolese war between 
1998 and 2003. Electronics industries started responding to the conflict minerals issue 
as early as in 2003 by commissioning a study on their corporate social responsibility 
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(CSR) as an end user of tantalum.1  
Since then, electronics industries have initiated various supply chain management 
programmes individually and/or collectively as they continue to use a large portion of 
these minerals in their products. To illustrate this point, they use more than 70 percent 
of tantalum supply in making capacitors for electronics (Polinares 2012). Their supply 
chain management programmes are mainly based on voluntary codes of conduct and 
attempt to ensure the supply chain responsibility for the first-tier suppliers. For example, 
the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), an industry organisation of 
electronics industry companies, developed a standardised code of conduct, the 
Electronics Industry Code of Conduct (Version 1.0), in 2004 in an effort to improve 
social, economic and environmental conditions in their global electronics supply chains.  
More recently, increasing awareness on how these minerals finance and sustain the 
protracted armed conflict in the eastern DRC, combined with a newly established UN 
business and human rights framework, initiated a paradigm shift in responsible supply 
chain management. This change in responsible supply chain management displays two 
aspects, namely enlarging supply chain responsibility to the total supply chain and 
making supply chain responsibility legally binding. Nevertheless, this shift poses a 
significant challenge of tracking and influencing the supply chain not only because of a 
complex web of global supply chains but also because of constant changes occurring in 
supply chains.  
The above challenge has to be met with a new strategy, and two responsible supply 
                                                        
1 The Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI), an electronics industry association, commissioned a study 
resulting in Hayes and Burge (2003). 
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chain management programmes, using a closed-pipe supply chain, have been developed 
to source conflict- free minerals from the DRC. This paper aims at examining these 
emerging responsible supply chain practices from peacebuilding perspectives. It will do 
so by reviewing available documentation and media sources on the two existing 
closed-pipe supply chain initiatives, the Solutions for Hope Project (SfH) to source 
tantalum and the Conflict-Free Tin Initiative (CFTI) for tin as well as informal 
conversations with representatives from electronics companies. The paper argues that 
the closed-pipe supply chain has a potential to build long-term relationships with 
various stakeholders, which could transform the structures in producer communities. 
The transformation, such as improving labour and environmental standards and 
livelihood and disseminating required knowledge and expertise on responsible 
production, could contribute to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The next section 
will explain the background of conflict minerals briefly, followed by the introduction of 
recent changes in supply chain management responsibility, generated chiefly by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The subsequent section 
will then look at the two closed-pipe supply chain initiatives, leading to a discussion and 
conclusions of this paper.           
Conflict minerals 
The eastern DRC is endowed with essential minerals such as tantalum, tin, tungsten and 
gold that have wide ranging applications, especially in mobile, high-tech goods. The 
demand for these “technology minerals” has been growing since the 1990s although it 
can be fluctuated sharply from technological advancement in an industry and cause 
boom and bust (Buijs and Sievers 2012). Nonetheless, the demand is expected to remain 
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high. At the same time, the eastern provinces of the DRC, South Kivu and North Kivu 
in particular, have been plagued by armed conflict and insecurity since 1996, generating 
one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The crisis has claimed more than five 
million people’s lives and caused approximately 2.6 million Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) as well as 450,000 Congolese refugees (UNHCR 2014). In addition, the 
widespread sexual violence in the area has attracted a label of the “rape capital of the 
world” from the former UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.  
In order to understand the relationship between the production and trade of mineral 
resources and armed conflict in the eastern DRC, numerous studies have been 
conducted. A series of investigations and reports made by the UN Panel of Experts 
between 2001 and 20032 was notable in highlighting the role of business in fuelling the 
DRC conflict. They were the first to publish a list of companies that were involved in 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. These investigations were 
followed by a number of other research initiatives by the UN Group of Experts, the 
Initiative for Central Africa (INICA), the Department for International Development 
(DFID) and Resource Consulting Services, to name some.3 In addition, there has been a 
growth of literature on the role of business in conflict since the 1990s, reflecting the 
globalised operations and the increasing size of corporations (Haufler 2003).  
These examinations, supported by the prominent “resource curse” hypothesis, suggest 
that the armed conflict in the eastern DRC is fuelled and sustained by the profits from 
the mineral resources in the area. According to Le Billon (2003, p. 216), the control, 
                                                        
2 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
3 See DFID 2007; INICA 2007; Garrett and Mitchell 2009; UNSC 2008. 
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exploitation, trade, taxation, or protection of “conflict resources” contribute to armed 
conflict or benefit from the context of armed conflict. As tantalum, tin, tungsten and 
gold extracted and traded from the conflict-affected eastern DRC partly finance the 
armed groups operating in the area, these mineral resources have been discussed as 
“conflict minerals.” Concerns for the “conflict minerals” have grown significantly 
owing to the growing global demand for these “technology minerals.” However, the link 
between the armed conflict and mineral resources is much more complex and appears to 
be interconnected with underlying socioeconomic and political issues in the area, often 
through ethnicity, citizenship and land ownership (Taka 2010; 2011). Furthermore, these 
minerals are mostly extracted from informal and unregulated artisanal mining and 
traded in the informal economy, largely due to economic collapse, poverty, lack of 
infrastructures and the weak governance capacity of the DRC state (Taka 2011).  
Given increased awareness and understanding of the “conflict minerals” issue, NGOs 
including Global Witness and the Enough Project have been advocating the cause of the 
DRC conflict and calling for action by governments and mineral users such as 
electronics companies. While several frameworks already exist to provide guidance for 
global companies operating in conflict-prone and/or weak governance states, including 
the OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance 
Zones (OECD 2006), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 
2011a) and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights4, there has been an 
intensifying effort to address the “conflict minerals” issue. The following section 
introduces such shift in supply chain management. 
                                                        
4 http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/introduction 
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Paradigm shift in supply chain management  
The “conflict minerals” issue illustrates one of the most challenges for the role of 
business in conflict and human rights violation which became a global policy agenda. In 
response to the growing need for guidance to address business impacts on human rights, 
the UN business and human rights framework was formulated by John Ruggie, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General, in 2008.  
The framework comprises three core principles of “the State duty to protect against 
human rights abuses by third parties, including business, the corporate social 
responsibility to respect human rights, and the need for more effective access to 
remedies” (Ruggie 2008, P. 4). In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
endorsed a new set of Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNHRC 
2011), which outlines how to implement the above UN framework to ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ (UN Office at Geneva 2011). The second principle of the framework 
states that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is the “basic expectation 
society has of business,” which requires due diligence (Ruggie 2008, p. 5). The 
framework defines due diligence as “a process whereby companies not only ensure 
compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a 
view to avoiding it” and hence strive to “do no harm” (Ruggie 2008, p. 9).  
An important implication of this development is that companies can be associated with 
human rights abuses within their supply chains even when they are not operating in the 
context of armed conflict or weak governance directly. It reinforces global supply chain 
management as a key strategic issue to overcome reputational risk. Therefore, human 
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rights due diligence became a key concept of the international movement for corporate 
accountability and provides a cornerstone in efforts to address conflict minerals in 
global supply chain. Achieving traceability of minerals is critical in these efforts; 
however it has proved extremely difficult because minerals supply chain “may span 
thousands of miles across the globe, involve numerous suppliers, retailers, and 
consumers, and be underpinned by multinational transportation and telecommunication 
networks” (Nagurney 2006, p. 3). In particular, the upstream supply chain of minerals in 
the eastern DRC poses a considerable challenge to establish traceability and apply due 
diligence processes owing to its extensive and complex networks, comprising artisanal 
mining and informal economy. According to a study conducted in 2010 (Resolve) to test 
whether it is possible to trace back the origin of conflict minerals from eleven 
electronics companies, only a limited number of cases could trace minerals back to the 
mines of origin. In some cases, the study found thirteen tiers between the producer and 
the mine. The study identified the issues of lack of supplier response, confidentiality 
and inadequate information as obstacles to achieving traceability.  
Despite the complexity of establishing traceability in the mineral supply chain, applying 
human rights due diligence became a requirement when the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act hereafter), containing a 
conflict minerals provision in Section 1502, was enacted in the US in July 2010 (SEC 
2010). The Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) finalised the rules of the 
provision in August 2012 after revising the rules proposed in 2010 which had been 
criticised for being extremely complex and vague in terms of the scope of the 
requirements and audit standards (KPGM 2011, p. 5). While the SEC rules does not 
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forbid purchasing of conflict minerals, it obliges at least 6,000 publicly traded 
companies in the U.S. to verify whether their products contain tantalum, tin, tungsten, 
gold or their derivatives originating from the DRC or its neighbouring countries (SEC 
2012). In case the products include minerals from the area, companies must trace the 
origin of minerals in their products, perform supply chain due diligence on their supply 
chain and publish reports. The provision will affect an enormous number of suppliers 
globally as similar legislation is also underway in the EU and others.  
Given the challenge of purchasing minerals without violating human rights or 
contributing to armed conflict, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) developed the “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas” (OECD 
2011b) (hereinafter the OECD Guidance). The OECD Guidance takes into 
consideration the complex operating environments in the eastern DRC and defines due 
diligence as: 
“an on-going, proactive and reactive process through which companies can 
ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict” (OECD 
2011b, p. 13).  
The OECD has also provided a five-step framework for risk-based due diligence in the 
mineral supply chain as follows: 
 Establish strong company management systems; 
 Identify and assess risk in the supply chain; 
 Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks; 
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 Carry out independent third-party audit of supply chain due diligence at 
identified points in the supply chain; and 
 Report on supply chain due diligence (OECD 2011b, p. 17-19). 
Although the OECD Guidance does not explain exactly how the due diligence process 
can be carried out (KPGM 2011, p. 7), it has been accepted as the international standard 
and is expected to help companies comply with the Dodd-Franck Act under Section 
1502 in establishing a process to exercise due diligence and generating the information 
for disclosure. 
Furthermore, the Congolese government introduced legislation in 2011 to require 
companies to perform supply chain due diligence in line with the OECD Guidance and 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), which also urges to exercise due 
diligence when operating in the tantalum, tin, tungsten or gold mining sectors 
(Government of Democratic Republic of Congo 2011). The International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), a regional body, also made the OECD Guidance 
requirement of its Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) (ICGLR n.d.). 
The emerging human rights due diligence approach, deriving from the business and 
human rights thinking, has created a fundamental change in supply chain management 
of conflict minerals in two ways. Firstly, performing human rights due diligence in 
minerals supply chain means extending producer responsibility to an entire supply chain, 
covering the very upstream supply chain at the extraction stage of raw materials. 
Secondly, the development of legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act has made supply 
chain management legally binding, signalling a departure from the voluntary supply 
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chain management through codes of conduct.  
At this point, it is worthwhile to reflect on the evolution of practical application and 
theory building about responsible supply chain management in the context of 
globalisation that will elucidate some opportunities and challenges. To begin with, 
supply chain is defined as: it “encompasses all activities associated with the flow and 
transformation of goods from raw materials’ stage (extraction), through to the end user, 
as well as the associated information flows” (Handfield and Nichols 1999, p. 2). It is 
also called the “logistics network” and is “a complex network of facilities dispersed 
over a large geography and in many cases, all over the globe” (Simchi-Levi et al. 2004, 
p. 4).  
Supply chain management, therefore, refers to “a set of approaches used to efficiently 
integrate suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses, and stores so that merchandise is 
produced and distributed at the right quantities, to the right locations, and at the right 
time in order to minimize systemwide costs while satisfying service-level requirements” 
(Simchi-Levi et al. 2004, p. 2). It is about being efficient and cost-effective to achieve a 
“sustainable competitive advantage” (Handfield and Nichols 1999, p. 2). In the context 
of globalisation, successful supply chain management entails constant moving between 
producers to adjust to changes in “relative costs, trade preference (quotas and tariffs) 
and political conditions” (Chapman 2004,P. 11). It, therefore, hinders creating 
permanent relationships and custom built factories. 
In contrast, responsible supply chain management integrates responsibility in its 
approach and is considered in terms of sustainability management; hence, the terms 
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responsible supply chain management and sustainable supply chain management are 
often used interchangeably (Szegedi and Kerekes 2012, p. 69). This means that the 
supply chain management has become a core part of CSR strategies and policies to 
address challenges of identifying social and environmental issues at different stages of 
supply chains, resulting in the development of various codes of conduct, standards and 
guidelines (Opijnen and Oldenziel 2010, p. 13).  
Regarding the definition of responsible supply chain management, there is no single 
definition. The UN Global Compact (UNGC) defines supply chain sustainability as 
(UNGC and BSR 2010, p. 5): 
“the management of environmental, social and economic impacts and the 
encouragement of good governance practices, throughout the lifecycles of goods 
and services. The objective of supply chain sustainability is to create, protect and 
grow long-term environmental, social and economic value for all stakeholders 
involved in bringing products and services to market.” 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (ICC 2007, p. 2) adds an explanation of 
the process and impact of the responsible supply chain management as follows:   
“Supply chain responsibility, also referred to as responsible sourcing, can be 
broadly defined as a voluntary commitment by companies to manage their 
relationships with suppliers in a responsible way. As a result of their purchasing 
activities, companies may have some opportunities to influence constructively 
their suppliers’ social and environmental performance. This can be done using 
several incentives, including information and training, as well as audits of 
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suppliers’ practices. Whatever mechanism is used, the most effective way to 
achieve sustained improvement over time is through the development of a 
long-term collaborative relation between corporate buyers and their suppliers, 
through which suppliers can internalize change by participating in the shaping of 
social and environmental performance objectives, based on their own perception 
of their business capacity and needs.” 
Both definitions refer to and emphasise on the long-term influence enabled by supply 
chain relations. Such influence is acknowledged in an executive’s comment (UNGC 
2010, p. 15): “the purchasing power of a corporation can become a unique driver for 
bringing about positive change in society.” While the ICC recognises the value of 
having a long-term relation in producing sustained improvements in social and 
environmental impacts, it is probably not realistic for companies to establish such 
long-term relationships with their suppliers because of the aforementioned flexibility 
required for being efficient and cost-effective (Handfield and Nichols 1999; Chapman 
2004). Chapman (2004, p. 11) points out that this frequent shifting undermines the 
efforts to improve labour and environmental standards by producers in developing 
countries and to monitor ethical standards by purchasing companies. From purchasing 
companies’ perspective, they have limited influence over their suppliers due to the 
temporary nature of the relationship with their suppliers (Opijnen and Oldenziel 2010, p. 
35-37). In general, companies’ influence over their suppliers beyond the first tier is 
considered to be unrealistic (Thorsen and Jeppesen 2011).      
As to the position of producers in developing countries, their likelihood to influence 
sustainability performance goals can be rather limited unlike the above statement by the 
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ICC. Ras and Vermeulen (2009) caution the danger of approaches to improve poor 
sustainable policies and practices in developing countries because value systems of the 
industrialised world are often imposed on developing countries by business-to-business 
standards from the business on the demand side to the supply side.  
A study on responsible supply chain management (Thorsen and Jeppesen 2011) 
classified individual codes of conduct as the 1st generation approach to responsible 
supply chain management and labelled shared codes of conduct for an entire industry or 
a code established through multi-stakeholder processes as the 2nd generation. While 
both approaches aspire to be fair, transparent, accountable and independently validated, 
the study exposes some limitations of these approaches. In general, it is difficult to 
measure and understand the impact of these codes of conduct especially when suppliers 
may be imposed multiple codes of conduct from different buying companies. More 
importantly, the study identifies some possible contradictions between conventional 
supply chain management criteria, including price, quality, delivery time and flexibility, 
and responsible supply chain management standards on human rights, the environment 
and anti-corruption standards and so forth. It also considers challenges to incorporate all 
human rights concerns in codes of conduct. 
Given challenges and limitations confronting the existing responsible supply chain 
management practices, the study suggests a third generation responsible supply chain 
management mechanism, “CSR risk free sourcing and investment zones” in a 
demarcated territory (Thorsen and Jeppesen 2011, p. 9). The proposed mechanism is 
inclusive of all suppliers and sub-suppliers in the specified area as a sustainable solution 
to CSR risk within the supply chain. Based on the commitment to invest in and source 
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from the designated area, companies can use their purchasing power to influence local 
state authorities in creating the zone and fulfiling their duty to enforce the legislation. 
For the mechanism to be effective, the local state authorities need to become able to 
perform monitoring and enforcement appropriately through capacity building.  
Closed-pipe supply chain as a new strategy  
The paradigm shift in supply chain management instigated from the human rights due 
diligence requirement, discussed in the above section, enforced the furtherance of 
various initiatives addressing conflict minerals supply chain. Similar to the proposed 
“CSR risk free sourcing and investment zones,” closed-pipe supply chains for conflict 
minerals have been initiated in the eastern DRC. This section looks at the two existing 
programmes, the Solutions for Hope Project (SfH) to source tantalum and the 
Conflict-Free Tin Initiative (CFTI) for tin. 
Solutions for Hope Project (SfH) 
The Solutions for Hope Project (SfH)5 were launched in July 2011 by Motorola 
Solutions Inc.6, a leading communications equipment manufacturer, and AVX 
Corporation7, a prominent tantalum capacitor manufacturer, as a pilot project to secure 
conflict-free tantalum from Katanga Province, south of South Kivu in the DRC. The 
SfH uses a closed-pipe supply chain and a defined set of key suppliers to source 
minerals in the region.  
                                                        
5 http://solutions-network.org/site-solutionsforhope/ 
6 www.motorolasolutions.com/ 
7 www.avx.com/ 
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In this closed-pipe supply chain, Coopérative Des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo 
(CDMC), a mining cooperative including artisanal miners and buyers in the whole 
Katanga Province, manage artisanal production and minerals purchase at the Mai Baridi, 
Kisengo and Luba mines, the concessions of the Mining Minerals Resources SPRL 
(MMR)8. Ores are weighed and logged at the mines as part of a traceability system, the 
International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi)9, by the 
local state agent, SAESSCAM (Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale 
Mining/Technical Assistance and Training Service for Small-Scale Mining). The iTSCi 
involves a chain of custody data collection to achieve traceability, adding a barcoded 
mine tag and a processor tag with a unique reference number to the each bag of minerals. 
The minerals are then transported to an MMR depot for export and purchased by the 
AVX Corporation with a global market price. The F&X Electro-Materials Limited, a 
Conflict Free Smelter (CFS)10 compliant smelter, as well as Smelters Global Advance 
Metals (GAM), Starck and Nigxia process the minerals into tantalum powder and wire 
for the AVX Corporation. The conflict free tantalum capacitors manufactured by the 
AVX Corporation are used by Motorola Solutions Inc., HP, Intel, Nokia, Foxconn and 
other participants in the project. That way, participating companies can buy tantalum 
from the production sites, organised by the MMR, under the project name, “Solutions 
for Hope.”  
                                                        
8 http://www.vinmartgroup.com/associates/mmr-sprl 
9 www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_zoo&view=item&Itemid=189 
10 The CFS program for tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold was developed by the joint Extractive 
Workgroup of two electronics industry association, Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and 
the GeSI. It is a voluntary program through which an independent third party assesses smelters to verify 
whether they demonstrate all the materials they processed are from conflict-free sources, using business 
process review and material analysis review.  
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In order to commence the project, the MMR pre-financed the implementation of iTSCi 
to become the first iTSCi verified mine concession in Katanga (Resource Consulting 
Services 2013). It has also made a significant investment in the project by providing 
training for CDMC, appointing a Due Diligence team to monitor the implementation of 
the OECD Guidance and ensuring regular remuneration of SAESSCAM agents, who 
monitor the traceability at the mine sites. In addition, the company made transparent 
contracts with a private security firm and the Congolese Police to ensure their role being 
solely the protection of the premises.        
The project supports other standards such as the Certified Trading Chains (CTC) 
developed by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources 
(BGR). The CTC aims at promoting traceability, transparency and responsible 
production standards in the artisanal small-scale mining sector, based on performance 
monitoring through third party baseline audits and compliance audits, leading to 
certification at a national level. The Mai Baridi mine was evaluated for compliance with 
the CTC and has been designated as a “Green” site. In addition, the MMR joined the 
Upstream Pilot Implementation of the OECD Guidance and was audited twice by an 
independent auditor against the OECD Guidance. The SfH also supports the Regional 
Certification Mechanism by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR)11. The ICGLR is a regional body of eleven African country members and aims 
at improving security and stability in the region by bringing to an end to the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in the region, so that the materials mined at its sites 
will be issued with ICGLR certificates.  
                                                        
11 www.icglr.org/ 
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The SfH project has despatched six ore shipments totalling over 145 metric tonnes as of 
June 2013. It was validated as a reliable system by the project evaluations conducted in 
January 2012 and between November 2012 and April 2013 and operates on a full scale. 
It aims to increase its sustainability and expandability and is open for participation by 
all companies including mining, smelters, component manufacturers and product 
manufacturers. 
Conflict-Free Tin Initiatives (CFTI) 
The Conflict-Free Tin Initiatives (CFTI)12 is another pilot closed-pipe supply chain 
programme and attempts to source conflict-free tin from the Kalimbi mine in Kalehe, 
South Kivu province. It was convened in September 2012 by the Dutch government 
together with industry partners in order to promote responsible sourcing and economic 
development in the DRC. The pilot intends to create demand for conflict-free tin and 
reverses the de facto embargo on the minerals in the DRC, posed by the Dodd-Frank 
Act. It does so by establishing a vertically-integrated supply chain including confirmed 
buyers of conflict-free tin from the Kivus. The operating system for the CFTI includes 
the iTSCi traceability and due diligence system, operated by Pact, an independent NGO, 
as well as the ICGLR framework to assist the reform initiatives by the DRC government 
and the Mines Ministry with the involvement of local civil society (CFTI 2012). The 
CFTI is also consistent with the OECD Guidance. It is open for participation by all 
companies and is currently participated by Royal Phillips Electronics, Tata Steel, 
Motorola Solutions, Blackberry, Alpha, AIM Metals & Alloys, Malaysia Smelting 
Corporation Berhad (MSC), Traxys, Fairphone and ITRI. 
                                                        
12 http://solutions-network.org/site-cfti/ 
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The project was launched on 24 October 2012 and is considered to be successful. The 
Kalimbi mine was agreed to be conflict free by the DRC government, the UN, the BGR, 
iTSCi and local business and civil society. It has produced more than 200 tonnes of tin 
and dispatched seven shipments to the identified smelter. There have been some other 
successes by the CFTI, namely the increased number of miners from 100 to 1,200, the 
improved income of miners from USD 2 to USD 4 –USD 6 per kilo, and enhanced 
working conditions and the health and safety standards, thereby contributing to the 
formalisation of the sector.  
The CFTI also has a local whistle blowing mechanism, called Comite de Surveillance et 
Anti-Corruption (CSAC)13, to monitor the mineral tagging system. The CSAC includes 
thirty multi-stakeholder members from the state mining agencies, the Congolese army 
and mining police, traditional chiefs, civil society and other local stakeholders. The 
members raise an alarm when there is an attempt to use the CFTI for smuggling 
minerals or an involvement of any armed groups and produce monthly monitoring 
reports. There has been a considerable improvement in the quality and detail of the 
incident reports as well as the ability to identify supply chain risks within the CSAC 
(Global Witness 2013).       
Despite the progress the CFTI has made in improving the standards of mineral 
production and supply chain risks, there was a smuggling operation in 2013, in which a 
member of the Congolese army had been pocketing a portion of minerals produced at 
the CFTI site (Global Witness 2013).14 While these minerals were not tagged with the 
                                                        
13 http://ogprdc.org/ 
14 Global Witness (2013) conducted field work in the eastern DRC in March 2013. 
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iTSCi, the fact that the army can yield benefits from the CFTI would damage the 
integrity and credibility of the project. The Kalimbi mine remained open during the 
worsening of the security situation in North Kivu in 2012; however, security dynamics 
pose a significant challenge to ensure mines and trading routes free of the army and 
armed groups as the CFTI recognises security as a crucial condition for its progress.     
Discussion and conclusions  
The closed-pipe supply chain initiatives by the SfH and CFTI seem to be successful in 
supplying conflict-free tantalum and tin from the eastern DRC since their inception. On 
one hand, they might have created a perception that all other minerals produced outside 
the closed-pipe supply chains are conflict minerals. On the other hand, they have 
demonstrated that it is possible to avoid the widepread boycott of minerals originated 
from the whole region as an easy option which is believed to have caused an unintended 
and undesirable effect on the limited livelihood of the local population (Young et al. 
2010). They displayed a remarkable departure from the responsible supply chain 
management based on codes of conduct and responded to the paradigm shift requiring 
full traceability and legal compliance. It is commendable that the SfH showed a 
significant commitment to start the groundbreaking closed-pipe supply chain project by 
providing finance as well as taking a risk. The SfH, therefore, served as a model for the 
CFTI and is expected to inspire further projects such as the joint Conflict-Free Tungsten 
Program by the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) and Tungsten Industry Conflict 
Minerals Council (TI-CMC)15. It is pertinent to consider whether this innovative, 
responsible supply chain approach can retain integrity and scalability and could 
                                                        
15 This new programme was announced in November 2013 (EICC 2013).  
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contribute to peacebuilding in the conflict-prone eastern DRC.              
In considering the integrity and scalability of the approach, there are a number of issues 
and challenges. Firstly, there is a grave concern regarding the robustness of the 
monitoring systems to maintain the integrity and credibility of the closed-pipe supply 
chain. This is not only because of the poor communication networks of the monitoring 
systems with other relevant stakeholders but also because of the problem arising from 
the rampant smuggling operations which are connected with the armed forces and high 
level corruption in the area (Global Witness 2013). It poses a particular challenge to 
address irregularities within the supply chain even when they are identified and red 
flagged. Those, who monitor the operations, can be threatened by the involvement of 
the armed forces; the security in the surrounding areas is an essential prerequisite. 
Secondly, while security is a necessary condition, the security dynamics in the area, 
especially in Kivus, have been fluid and causing uncertainty. It makes finding other 
mine sites to replicate the initiative difficult and threatens the operation of the existing 
conflict-free mine sites.  
Lastly, the closed-pipe supply chain initiatives for conflict-free minerals need more 
buyers in order to make them economically viable according to a participating company 
of the CFTI.16 Increasing participants will require more and steady production by 
expanding mine sites, hence scaling up of the initiative. If the security condition cannot 
be maintained, the initiatives will end up as a charitable endeavour, hence, will not be 
sustainable.      
                                                        
16 Informal conversation with a representative of an electronics company, participating in the CFTI, on 
23 October 2013 in Brussels.  
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As for the peacebuilding potential of the closed-pipe supply chain, there are some 
positive features within the initiatives. First and foremost, the long-term commitment 
made by the closed-pipe supply chain participants enables opportunities to provide 
useful skills, knowledge and expertise for responsible production and to improve labour 
and environmental standards and livelihood. Therefore, it can foster long-term 
collaborative relationships amongst the stakeholders which could transform the 
socio-economic structures in producer communities (Ras and Vermeulen 2009). Such 
transformative relationships could build host communities’ capacities for sustainable 
community development and influence issues relevant to the conflict background (Kolk 
and Lenfant 2013, p. 486).  
In addition, the SfH directly engages with the security issues by signing clear and 
transparent contracts with the private security firm and the Congolese Police, thereby 
trying to prevent the involvement of the armed forces in the mine sites. While this kind 
of collaborative and transformative relationship is essential in peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention, it would not be possible with conventional global sourcing 
strategies which require constant changes between producers and suppliers to achieve 
competitive advantage.   
From the above, the closed-pipe supply chain initiatives are considered to employ a 
transformative approach and constructive engagement with a broad range of 
stakeholders. Therefore, they could address some critiques made against conflict 
sensitive approach based on “do no harm,” demonstrated by boycotting, or certification 
programmes such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to curtail the 
flow of conflict diamonds by assuring the origin of diamonds. Although the KPCS was 
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praised for formalising the international diamond trade and increased tax revenues for 
producing countries, weak internal controls in producing countries with porous borders 
and extensive artisanal mining and informal economy have been posing a threat to the 
integrity of the system (Mitchell 2012). Moreover, the KPCS does not address the issues 
of development and human rights violation in producing communities (Le Billon and 
Levin 2009).  
The conflict sensitive approach including certification schemes may serve to reduce 
risks for companies, but does not solve existing conflict or prevent potential conflict. On 
the contrary, the closed-pipe supply chain for responsible supply chain management 
resonates conflict transformation scholarship, which stresses holistic change at all levels 
to transform structural, cultural and relational causes underlying the conflict (Lederach 
2003). Therefore, it has a potential to play the role of business in peacebuilding as 
Nelson (2007, p. 7) described: to “proactively create positive societal value by 
optimising the external multipliers of their own business operations and engaging in 
innovative social investment, stakeholder consultation, policy dialogue, advocacy and 
civic institution building.” There is a need to involve even wider stakeholders and 
gather support for this potentially peacebuilding and innovative approach by ensuring 
security in the area. Moreover, there is a need to conduct further research to evaluate the 
progress and impact of the approach on socio-economic and political structures in the 
producing communities. The research will contribute to the emerging scholarship in 
“peace through commerce” and could inspire the aspiration of the private sector to 
“work on conflict” constructively.     
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